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Global Disorder and the Limits
of ‘Dialogue’
JEREMY SALT
ABSTRACT Since 2001 (designated as the UN Year of Dialogue Among
Civilisations) several initiatives have been developed as a means of resolving
problems whose causes have been ascribed, primarily by Samuel Huntington
and Bernard Lewis, to civilisational difference. This article questions responses
to the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis which seem to accept the postulates on which
it is based. It suggests that while dialogue is an indispensable tool of social
cohesion, the source of many of the problems that pose a continuing threat to
regional and global order is not ‘civilisational difference’ but the failure of
governments to comply with international laws and conventions they have sworn
to uphold. The explanation that ‘civilisational difference’ is the root cause of
global disorder allows them to sidestep responsibility for the consequences of
their own policies. Manipulation of the United Nations at the level of the
Security Council is further evidence that the answer to global problems lies in
redressing the failings of an entrenched world system that is based far more on
power and state perceptions of self-interest than justice. The clearest evidence of
structural weakness in the international system is to be found in the Middle
East, where the UN Secretary-General’s former special representative to the
‘peace process’, Alvaro de Soto, has drawn attention to the disjunction between
public declarations of good intentions and high-level manipulation of this
‘process’ by powerful actors from behind the scenes. The article concludes that
where dialogue is not the problem, it cannot be the solution.
The debate over the root causes of global instability has continued without
let-up since the bombing of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.
The extent to which instability is actually global in nature obviously varies
according to how and by whom it is being interpreted. In the dominant leftist
narrative, it is the inevitable secondary outcome of the structural violence
built into, implied and to a degree tacitly sanctioned by a world system built
on power. There is certainly no doubt that resentment of the governments
and financial institutions of the West and those who are seen as their political
clients and regional agents, and are in many cases only able to stay in power
through the provision of large amounts of ‘foreign aid’, is strongly felt across
Jeremy Salt is in the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.
Email: jeremy@bilkent.edu.tr.
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, pp 691 – 710

































the developing world. According to the arguments adumbrated by Bernard
Lewis and Samuel P Huntington within the context of an actual or looming
‘clash of civilisations’, however, the economic and political grievances that
appear to be the cause of resentment of the West are merely the symptoms of
the real cause—civilisational difference. In the historical game of winners and
losers, so the argument goes, resentment of the West arises from a civilisa-
tional inferiority complex. Nowhere is this more apparent than among
Muslims. Lewis is only concerned with ‘Islam and the West’. Huntington
applies the theory more generally, but makes his most provocative claims (ie
what he calls a Muslim ‘propensity’ for violence) in the same civilisational
context as Lewis. The depiction of a Muslim world driven by a deep-seated
resentment of the West that is scarcely rational very much suited the purposes
of radical US conservatives already planning an aggressive foreign policy
resurgence based on ‘pre-emptive’ or ‘counter- anticipatory’ military action
on a global scale. The ‘clash of civilisations’ theory neatly exculpated Western
governments from the consequences of their actions. If resentment at Western
success was the root cause of problems between ‘Islam and the West’, the
source of the problem lay on the Muslim side and it was up to Muslims to get
their house in order. The West would help by promoting ‘Western values’, by
supporting ‘moderate’ Muslim governments and by taking forceful measures
to extinguish terrorism at its source.
Few articles intended for a limited readership can have attracted as much
general attention as Huntington’s ‘A clash of civilizations?’.1 Neither in the
article nor the book that followed,2 however, is there any sustained analysis
of the consequences of Western policies as they have been experienced by
Muslims. The emphasis is on the social and economic shortcomings of
Muslim societies, which Huntington sees as a breeding ground for anti-
Western actions. His attribution to Muslims of a ‘propensity’ for violence is
extraordinary against the background of the genocidal destruction directed
outwards from ‘Christian’ Europe from the beginning of the ‘age of
expansion’ in the 15th century up to the present. His reference to ‘Islam’s
bloody borders’ fails to take into account that, while the early Muslim
states—Arab, Mughal, Seljuq and Ottoman Turk among them—succeeded in
imposing borders on surrounding rulers, in the past four centuries it was an
ascendant West that imposed borders and a vanquished East that had no
option but to accept them (the successful Turkish national resistance to the
British and the French after 1918 is a rare exception).3
Although the ‘clash of civilisations’ propelled Huntington to global
prominence and ‘brand’ recognition among many people who had doutbless
never heard of him before, the genesis of the phrase lies in the writings of
Bernard Lewis. He began developing the theme in the 1950s as a means of
explaining (or explaining away) Arab national resistance to imperialism and
colonialism. To Lewis the true source of Arab hostility to the West was not
Palestine (the ‘licensed grievance’ as he dismissively describes it4) nor British
and French policies of occupation and domination played out across the
entire region, from the Atlantic coast of Morocco down to the southern tip of


































triumphant newcomer. Professor Lewis takes his reader into the mind of one
‘Arab’ to illustrate the suffering of all in the face of Western success:
Even after liberation the intelligent and sensitive Arab cannot but be aware of
the continued subordination of his culture to that of the West. His richest
resource is oil—but it is found and extracted by Western processes and
machines to serve the needs of Western inventions. His greatest pride is his new
army—but it uses Western arms, wears Western-style uniforms and marches to
Western tunes. His ideas and ideologies even of anti-Western revolt derive
ultimately from Western thought. His knowledge even of his own history and
culture owes much to Western scholarship. His writers, his artists, his
technicians, even his tailors, testify by their work to the continued supremacy
of Western civilization—that ancient rival, the conqueror and now the model of
the Muslim. Even the gadgets and garments, the tools and amenities of his
everyday life are symbols of bondage to an alien and dominant culture which he
hates and admires, imitates but cannot share. It is a deeply wounding, deeply
humiliating experience.6
Having summed up the minds of all Arabs by looking into the mind of one,
and then speaking for him, a casebook example of the orientalist at work,
Lewis advises his readers that ‘we’ shall be better able to understand the
situation if ‘we view the present discontents of the Middle East not as a
conflict between states or nations but as a clash between civilizations’.7 Three
decades later Arab nationalism has been replaced by an Islamic resurgence.
The civilisational focus has changed, the ideological focus has changed, the
geographical setting has changed from regional to global, but the ‘clash’
somehow remains the same. There is a mood and a movement afoot, writes
Professor Lewis, ‘far transcending the level of issues and policies and
governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—
that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against
our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present and the worldwide
expansion of both.’8 On this basis he builds a case for Muslim hatred of
the West, the roots of which ‘must be sought in the millennial history of
relations between Islam and Christendom’.9 In a sense, ‘they’ve been hating
us for centuries and it’s very natural that they should. You have this
millennial rivalry between two world religions and now from their point of
view the wrong one seems to be winning.’10
The civilisational theme is scarcely new. British and French invasion of
Muslim lands in the 19th century were justified in the name of civilisation and
Muslim resistance portrayed as being mad and fanatical. Sir William Muir’s
observation that ‘the sword of Mahomet, and the Coran, are the most
stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty and Truth which the world has yet
known’ was snapped up by the coming generation of Christian polemicists.11
This adversarial view has now been reinforced by Huntington and Lewis
beneath a globalised modern veneer of references to migration and the
generally high unemployment rate among young men in Muslim societies
that is supposedly feeding ‘Islamic terrorism’, the late 20th century

































incarnation of the ‘Mohammedan fanaticism’ of the 19th. Resentment,
anger, rage and hatred have been built into the old discourse of violence,
sexuality and power, again setting up an enemy whose hostility has no
rational cause, leaving the rational West with no option but to ‘defend’ itself
through military attack abroad and through the introduction at home of
draconian measures striking at the heart of ‘Western values’ in the name of
combating terrorism.
The bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September
2001 (designated as the UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations) was
represented in numerous quarters as validating the Lewis–Huntington line.
Following a further act of terror, the bombing of Madrid’s Atocha railway
terminal on 11 March 2004, the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero, called for an ‘alliance of cultures’ that would head off the ‘clash of
civilisations’ by deepening political, cultural and educational relations
‘between those who represent the so-called Western world and, in this
historic moment, the area of Arab and Muslim countries’.12 Mr Zapatero
was joined by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, where in
2003 suicide bombings of the British consulate in Istanbul and other
buildings with a Western face (including the HSBC bank) had killed more than
60 people. The strong support of Erdogan had particular importance because
of the perception of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between east and west, as a country
whose Justice and Development Party government represented a ‘moderate’
form of Islam, and because Turkey was a predominantly Muslim country
seeking membership of the EU. The outcome of their initiatives was the
formal establishment, in November 2005, of an Alliance of Civilisations. The
members of the High-Level Group appointed under the aegis of the United
Nations to chart the path ahead included former Iranian president
Muhammad Khatami (who had led the way by calling for a ‘dialogue of
civilisations’ in 1998); South Africa’s Archbishop Desmond Tutu; former
UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor; Turkish State Minister Mehmet
Aydın; former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine; former Inter-
American Development Bank head Enrique Iglesias; and André Azoulay,
an adviser to King Mohammed VI of Morocco.
The Dialogue Among Civilisations and the Alliance of Civilisations were
joined in March 2006, by a third major initiative, the Coexistence of
Civilisations project established by the Danish research institute Monday
Morning,13 creating between them a global network of good intentions. In
May 2007 Jorge Sampaio was appointed UN High Representative for the
Alliance of Civilisations. In January 2008 the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki
Moon, opening a two-day conference of the Alliance in Madrid, declared
that ‘Never before in our lifetime has there been a more desperate need for
constructive and committed dialogue among individuals, among cultures
[and] among and between nations’.14 In the words of Señor Sampaio, writing
ahead of the conference, ‘The complex international situation created in the
wake of 11 September, as well as other terrorist attacks that have constantly
marked this decade, has turned dialogue between civilisations, religions and



































European support for dialogue was strongly driven by European needs. The
rapid transformation of European societies from mono- to multiculturalism
and the close proximity in the southern and eastern Mediterranean of
Muslim states emphasised the need for dialogue within as well as between.
The issues affecting the debate over questions of national and European
identity included demographics (migration and the generally higher birth rate
among European Muslims), terrorism (the bombings of the Madrid and
London public transport systems in 2004 and 2005), youth unemployment,
multiculturalism, the wearing of the hijab, free speech (raised most notably
by the publication in September 2005 of Danish cartoons mocking the
Prophet Muhammad, and by the murder in 2004 of the Dutch film maker
Theo van Gogh after the screening of his film Submission, which shows verses
of the Qu’ran inscribed on the body of a naked woman), the accession
negotiations over Turkish membership of the EU and the Pope’s speech on
the relative merits of Islam and Christianity.
The infuriated reaction of Muslims worldwide to the publication of the
Danish cartoons revived memories of the response nearly two decades earlier
to the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses (revived again
in 2007 with the British government’s award of a knighthood to the author).
Flemming Rose, the cultural affairs editor of the newspaper which published
the cartoons, Jyllands-Posten, argued that by commissioning and publishing
the cartoons he was seeking to challenge politically correct self-censorship and
extend the boundaries of free speech. Furthermore, his intention was to show
Muslims that he considered them as Danish as anyone else.
Equal treatment is the democratic way to overcome traditional barriers of
blood and soil for newcomers. To me, that means treating immigrants just as I
would any other Danes. And that’s what I felt I was doing in publishing the 12
cartoons of Mohammed last year. Those images in no way exceeded the bounds
of taste, satire and humor to which I would subject any other Dane, whether
the queen, the head of the church or the prime minister. By treating a Muslim
figure the same way I would a Jewish or Christian icon, I was sending an
important message: You are not strangers, you are here to stay, and we accept
you as an integrated part of our life. And we will satirize you, too. It was an act
of inclusion, not exclusion, an act of respect and recognition.16
In fact, it was not quite as straightforward as that. A prophet is not a prime
minister or the head of a church and if Danish Muslims really were to be
treated the same as other Danes, their rights would surely have to include the
right to be protected from what they (not Flemming Rose) decided was not
just insulting but blasphemous. The Christian church was built up around
graven images. Islam has no church and does not allow the reproduction of
images of the Prophet. Furthermore, contrary to Flemming Rose’s claim that
everyone was up for mockery, it turned out that Jyllands-Posten had
previously refused to publish caricatures of Jesus Christ on the grounds that
its readers would find them offensive. And finally, the decision to publish the

































cartoons could hardly be disconnected from Flemming Rose’s opinions
about the ‘unpleasant realities’ behind Europe’s ‘failed experiment’ with
multiculturalism. ‘It’s time for the Old Continent to face facts and make
some profound changes in its outlook on immigration, integration and the
coming Muslim demographic surge. After decades of appeasement and
political correctness, combined with growing fear of a radical minority
prepared to commit serious violence, Europe’s moment of truth is here.’17
In the more stridently Islamophobic view of others (notably the Egyptian-
born writer Bat Ye’or and the late Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci but also
ultra right- wing political parties in most member countries of the EU),
Europe was on the point of self-immolation in a new land mass called
‘Eurabia’. The southern Mediterranean littoral was no longer the focal point
of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue but an ‘exposed flank’,18 from which
Europe was being threatened with inundation through the migration of
Muslims looking for work, unwilling to compromise their identity, difficult to
assimilate and harbouring among them the agents of jihadi fundamentalism.
The suggestion early in 2008 by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan
Williams, that aspects of shar’ia law might be introduced into Britain in the
interests of social harmony, was followed not just by widespread criticism of
what he was thought to be saying but by attacks on ‘multiculturalism’ in
general.19 Returning to the civilisational fray early in 2007, Professor Lewis
told an audience at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington that the
struggle between Islam and Christendom had entered a new stage.20 This
struggle had begun at the very onset of Islam with the ‘declaration of war’
through letters purportedly sent by the Prophet Muhammad to the Byzantine
emperor and other rulers, calling on them to ‘resign or submit’. A ‘first wave’
of attack on Europe had been launched by Arab Muslims, a second by the
Ottoman Turks and now, in the eyes of a ‘fanatical and resolute’ minority of
Muslims (in the eyes of Professor Lewis), a ‘third wave’ is underway. ‘We
should not delude ourselves as to what it is and what it means. This time it is
taking different forms and two in particular: terror and migration’. And this
time it might be ‘third time lucky’ for the Muslims.
Islam and Europe was also the theme of the lecture given by Pope Benedict
XVI at theUniversity ofRegensburg on 12 September 2006.21His starting point
was a conversation between the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and
an unnamed educated Muslim Persian late in the 14th century. The subject
matter was Christianity and Islam. For the Pope the early injunction against
compulsion in religion is outweighed by what he understands of jihad. On the
question of the relationship between religion and violence he quotes the
Emperor as saying: ‘Showme just whatMohammed brought that was new, and
there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread
by the sword the faith he preached’. The Emperor goes on to explain why
spreading the faith through violence is unreasonable:
God . . . is not pleased by blood and not acting reasonably . . . is contrary to God’s
nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to


































or threats . . . To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm or
weapons of any kind or any other means of threatening a person with death.
The Pope adds his understanding of the Emperor’s statement: ‘The decisive
statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: not to act in
accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature. The editor [of the
dialogue between Manuel and his Persian visitor], Theodore Khoury,
observes: for the Emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy,
this statement is self evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely
transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even
rationality’. In another significant passage the Pope writes of the ‘inner
rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry’ as
being
an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of
religions but also from that of world history - it is an event which concerns us
even today. Given this convergence it is not surprising that Christianity, despite
its origins and some significant developments in the East, finally took on its
historically decisive character in Europe. We can also express this the other way
around: this convergence, with the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage,
created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called
Europe.
Although church spokesmen claimed that he had been misunderstood, the
Pope’s reproduction and apparent acceptance of one of the main themes of
the medieval canon—Islam as a religion of violence—could not but outrage
Muslims everywhere. Conversion by force is not sanctioned by Islam.22 The
secondary argument that, whereas in Christianity to act against reason is to
act against the will of God, Islam imposes divine authority on the believer
irrespective of reason, is not acceptable to Muslims either. Divine sanction
makes no sense in any religion unless the believer bears the responsibility for
choosing between good and evil. Responsibility is born of choice, choice is
born of reason and reason is born of rationality. Finally, nowhere in his
speech does the Pope reflect on the similarity between the two religions in
their interface with philosophy.
The Pope’s emphasis on the Christian–Greek–Roman roots of European
identity seemed to reinforce the view he had expressed in 2004 when, as
Cardinal Ratzinger, he said that Turkish membership of the EU would be a
‘grave error against the tide of history’. Rather contradictorily, during his
visit to Istanbul in November 2006, Pope Benedict was reported to have
expressed support for Turkey’s admission to the EU on the basis of what a
Vatican spokesman (but not the Pope himself) described as ‘common values
and principles’.23 In fact, after years of being delayed, and of seeing other
countries being pushed to the head of the membership queue, many Turks
had by this time lost hope in the possibility of EU admission whether the
Pope supported it or not. In a frank interview with Der Spiegel, Prime
Minister Erdogan observed that support for membership among Turks had
dropped in the past two years from 70% to 30%.

































If you ask if they want Turkey to become a EU member, 60 to 65 per cent still
say yes. But if you ask ‘Do you believe Europe will accept Turkey?’ 60 per cent
say no . . . One could set 2014 or 2015 for our accession to the EU, but above all
I am calling on the EU to be honest. If the EU doesn’t want us they should say
it now and clearly. If we are not wanted then both sides don’t need to waste
their time with negotiations. Is Europe a home for an alliance of civilizations or
is it a Christian club? If the former is true then Turkey should be part of it.24
The signs are not promising. Germany’s Chancellor Merkel believes the
European relationship with Turkey should be limited to a ‘privileged
partnership’ and the election of Nicolas Sarkozy (who in 2005 described
rioting young French Muslims as ‘scum’) has greatly strengthened the anti-
Turkish camp. ‘I have not changed my mind’, he told Le Figaro after the
election. ‘Turkey has no place in Europe.’25 For the EU’s Enlargement
Commission, Ollie Rehn, a ‘clash of civilisations’ would indeed result if Mr
Sarkozy succeeded in blocking Turkey’s accession.26
Discovery
The Dialogue, Alliance and Coexistence Between Civilisations all seem
implicitly to accept the foundation on which the notion of an impending
‘clash’ is constructed, ie the division of the world into separate civilisations.
Among ‘civilisationalists’, from Arnold Toynbee onwards, typologies,
classifications, criteria and numbers differ but whether there are numerous
civilisations or just ‘one universal civilization’, as the 19th century French
historian François Guizot believed,27 what is not in doubt is the instrumental
use of the word ‘civilisation’ to justify invasion, conquest and genocide down
through the centuries. Neither is there any doubt of the interdependence of
civilisations through trade, diplomacy and the exchange of knowledge. They
are not and probably never have been self-contained. Martin Bernal has
written extensively on the Afro-Nilotic input into ‘western civilization’ during
its ‘classic’ (Greek) period,28 while John Hobson has drawn attention to
‘western’ borrowings, scientific, technical and intellectual, from ‘eastern’
(primarily Chinese, Indian and Muslim Arab) societies.29 Hamilton Gibb, the
pre-eminent western scholar of Islam in the first half of the 20th century,
underlined in his studies the interdependent nature of so-called Western and
Islamic civilisations at all levels, scientific and intellectual: ‘on this point there
can be no doubt—that the civilization of the Middle East and that of the so-
called ‘Western’ world are closely related; both before and after the rise of
Islam there had been inter-penetration between them’.30 States were also
similar in the way they were governed. With some exceptions in both
categories, the ‘Islamic state’ was no more of a dogmatic state than the
‘Christian’ state. Such statements as the ‘often-noted lack of a tradition of
secular politics’ in Muslim histories 31 are not borne out in the way Muslim
governments were actually run. Philip K Hitti drew attention a long time ago
to the essentially secularised nature of the Arab caliphates as far back as the


































an ‘Islamic state’ was in fact a hybrid in which religious law and Ottoman
traditions together formed the basis of government and administration. All
these states were run according to the same pragmatic conventions of dynastic
succession and statecraft as nominally Christian states, further reducing the
ostensible differences between Western and Islamic civilisations. By any
reasonable standard of piety, many of their rulers could not even be regarded
as ‘good’Muslims (any more than some ‘Christian’ kings and princes could be
said to be ‘good’ Christians). Dogma followed statecraft, with religion utilised
to provide the justification for wars, peace, the acquisition of territory and the
signing of treaties and the establishment of diplomatic relations.
If the ‘Islamic’ state was not truly Islamic, and the ‘Christian’ state not
truly Christian, with rulers bending the rules to suit their interests; if
civilisations are not separate but interdependent; if ‘Christianity’ was
constructed by the church as an institution to serve its interests, and utilised
by the ‘Christian’ state to serve its interests; if ‘Islam’ has been constructed as
a monolith by the West to create an enemy it needed; if the West is itself no
more than a concept, summoned into life in 1945 to justify ideological and
strategic confrontation with a Soviet East, in the name of defending ‘Western
interests’ that were actually the interests of specific governments, then the
civilisational debate indeed assumes a spectral quality.
If what has been taking shape over many millennia is not the development of
separate civilisations but the rise of a world system, ending up in the past half
millennium as Immanuel Wallerstein’s world capitalist system, then the
‘dialogue of civilisations’ indeed becomes no more than ‘an ideological formula
which, in the message of tolerance and relativism it conveys, betrays a choice to
reject the unitary nature of the world we live in’. In the words of Caglar Keyder:
It adheres to a model of the world where conflict is between monolithic
civilizations and [it] makes the inequalities and hierarchies within the unique
world system, whose workings are the dominant cause of conflict, difficult to see.
Especially when any aggression is packaged in terms of irreconcilable conflict
among civilizations and any challenge to power is presented as evidence that
there is a clash of civilizations, there is a responsibility to expose the rhetoric and
to struggle against the imposed agenda. There has been a single world civilization
at least since the expansion of the West started five hundred years ago.33
If the ultimate source of the world’s problems lies in the failings of the world
system, measured against the rights and needs of the overwhelming bulk of
the world’s people, and not in a ‘clash of civilisations’, then the Dialogue of
Civilisations can hardly be the answer: like the ‘clash of civilisations’, it has
the potential to turn into a well publicised distraction which diverts attention
from the true sources of the most pressing transnational problems as they
affect Muslims
Reality check
In the world system the exercise of military, economic and diplomatic power
has been the privilege of the West in its different religious, national and

































imperial incarnations for the best part of half a millennium. This is the period
Bernard Lewis now sees as coming to an end.34 In fact the power of the
amorphous West is the power of particular governments, expressed
unilaterally and multilaterally in all global organisations, including the
IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations and the G8. These organisations
are no more than the sum of their parts, their decisions weighted in favour of
the most powerful. The decision to partition Palestine in 1947 is a prime
example of how the UN was corrupted by power within two years of its
foundation. In effect, it was not the General Assembly which decided that
Palestine should be partitioned but President Truman, who orchestrated a
campaign of intimidation of vulnerable governments from behind the scenes
to make sure that the resolution got over the line. Without this interference,
undertaken to boost Truman’s electoral standing at home, it would never
have been passed.
In democratic systems there is no parliament as incongruous as the world
parliament represented by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In
this parliament it is the lower house that has advisory power and the upper
house that exercises such real power as the world body has. In recent years
the Security Council has been frequently used to give the imprimatur of UN
endorsement to actions that would never have been supported by the
majority of its members. The power of the five permanent members of the
Security Council resembles the power of Plato’s Nocturnal Council or
the power of Iran’s Council of Guardians over the majlis. This is hardly
accidental. The League of Nations was constructed to give the strongest hand
to its most powerful members and so was the United Nations. The theory
that they would act more responsibly has been exploded time after time. It
was with the authority of the council that a decade of sanctions was
maintained against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US-led
counter-attack on Iraq early the following year. The catastrophic humani-
tarian consequences (with hundreds of thousands of children among the one
million people dying as the direct or indirect result of the denial of essential
services and goods) represented serial breaches of the UN’s own conventions
and treaties. Behind the façade of the council’s authority lay the
determination of the US and British governments to see that sanctions were
maintained against a rising tide of world opposition based on revulsion at
what was being done to Iraq in the name of disarmament.
The Security Council is also to be judged by what it chooses not to do. In
international law there is surely little difference between Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but there was
certainly a difference in how the Security Council reacted. Iraq was censured
and subjected to sanctions within days, whereas the actions of the USA and
its war partners, far from being censured, were actually endorsed through the
Security Council’s approval of the establishment of a government of
occupation (the Coalition Provisional Authority) and through the passage
of a resolution (in June 2004) miraculously transforming the invading forces
into a ‘multinational force’. Since March 2003, the birthplace of civilisa-


































probably the greatest level of death, dislocation and destruction in its multi-
millennial history, and yet the Security Council has raised its voice only to
put its stamp of approval on the invasion. Forty years have now passed
without sanctions being applied against Israel for its occupation of
Palestinian and Syrian territory seized in 1967 (not to speak of the territory
seized in 1948 in breach of the partition plan). The expansion of Jewish
settlements towards the Jordan river continues with the tacit support of the
US administration. The persecution and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in
Hebron is itself sufficient cause for the Security Council to take action, yet it
does nothing and can do nothing because any resolution will run up against
the barrier of the US veto.
These anomalies scarcely go unnoticed in the Muslim world. In summer
2006 the Security Council failed to react during Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon
because the Bush administration would not allow it to call for a ceasefire. It
held Israel’s coat for week after week in the hope that the Israeli military
machine would destroy Hizbullah. The outcome (without Hizbullah being
destroyed or Israel’s captured soldiers being released) was the destruction of
roads, bridges, power stations, fuel storage depots and apartment buildings.
Cluster bombs were scattered over villages and fields of southern Lebanon.
About one third of the 1400 Lebanese civilians killed were children, with
entire families obliterated in their homes by Israel’s ‘defence’ forces without
the Security Council intervening. The manipulation of the council by the USA
in an attempt to force Iran to forego nuclear development is a further example
of how it has become a political tool in the hands of the permanent members
rather than developing into an instrument for keeping world order. Sanctions
invoked in the name of the Security Council may yet be used to justify a
military attack on Iran as well.
Morally ambiguous
The role of the Secretary-General in directing this morally ambiguous
universe called the UN is obviously critical. Kofi Annan launched the Alliance
of Civilisations and has since remarked that the UN ‘can be the true home
of the dialogue among civilizations’ and ‘the place where such dialogue can
flourish and bear fruit in every field of human endeavor’.35 These noble
sentiments are not to be decried. However, if the UN is to be improved not
just as a forum for dialogue, but as one in which dialogue is organically linked
to decisions and action, it urgently needs reform. It is clearly falling far short
of the ideals embedded in the charter, and the way the Secretary-General
discharges his responsibilities is regarded by many as part of the problem.
Mr Annan filled the office from 1997 until his retirement in 2006. His
predecessor was Butros Butros Ghali, the former Egyptian foreign minister
and an ‘enlightened’ conservative who had overseen the publication of two
major UN reports, Agenda for Peace and Agenda for Development.36 His
Arab world perspective and Third World orientation soon put him at
loggerheads with the USA, which had been lukewarm about his appointment
in the first place. He criticised the NATO bombing of Serbia, and indeed the

































US preoccupation with southeastern Europe, at a time genocide was being
committed in Rwanda and Somalia was gripped by famine. In 1996 the
inquiry he ordered into the Israeli bombardment of the UNIFIL compound at
Qana in southern Lebanon on 18 April brought matters to a head. Video film
shot by a Norwegian soldier showed an Israeli pilotless drone flying over the
compound before and during the bombardment, undermining the Israeli
claim that the shelling in which 106 Lebanese men, women and children were
killed was accidental. After pressure from the USA Butros-Ghali released a
‘carefully edited’ version of the critical findings of the committee sent to
Qana, but it was still strong enough to seal his fate as far as the US
administration was concerned.37 When his mandate came up for renewal
later in 1996, senior US officials working under the instructions of the US
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, set in motion ‘Operation Orient
Express’ to ensure that it would not be renewed.38 The Secretary-General’s
reappointment was supported by all members of the Security Council but
one, and after the USA had vetoed the results of seven ballots in his favour
the council voted for Kofi Annan. With his appointment, remarked one Bush
administration official, the USA now had a Secretary-General able ‘to
understand the importance of cooperation with the world’s first power’.39
Under the UN Charter (Article 100), ‘each member undertakes to respect
the exclusively international character of the Secretary-General and the staff
and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities’.
For their part, the Secretary-General and his staff are obliged to refrain ‘from
any action which might reflect on their positions as international officials
responsible only to the Organisation’ (article 100). The Secretary-General is
described in the UN Charter as the organisation’s ‘chief administrative
officer’, when he is clearly much more than that. The position of Secretary-
General implies a moral purpose. Just as the efficient manager is expected to
ensure that his company’s products are produced to the highest possible
material standards, so the Secretary-General has the putative responsibility
of seeing that the moral output of the UN meets the criteria that have been
laid down in the Charter and in the international covenants that are the
foundation of the organisation’s work. It is in this context that Mr Annan
has been criticised, especially for not speaking out against the breaches of the
UN charter represented by NATO’s air attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 and by
the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Security Council’s imprimatur on a
decade of sanctions and its inaction in the face of the invasion links up with
the suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in which Sergio
Vieira de Mello, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Iraq, and
many of his staff were killed. In the words of Alvaro de Soto, the Secretary-
General’s Personal Representative to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority
as well as Special Co-ordinator of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP):
‘The UN deployed there in circumstances under which the UN does not
normally operate. Does anyone doubt that the attack took place because the
UN was seen to be under the aegis of those who are seen by the perpetrators
as the occupiers? Am I mistaken in believing that the UN was attacked as the


































For its insights into the realities of power at the highest level of UN
operations, the leaked confidential report issued by Alvaro de Soto on his
tenure in office has few rivals in recent history and is worthy of detailed
consideration for that reason. Mr de Soto’s peace-process-related terms of
reference included Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the further
Palestinian territories seized by Israel in its war of 1967. Shortly after his
appointment in May 2005, the Middle East political map was transfigured by
three developments: first, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal of its settlers from
Gaza (August, 2005); second, Ariel Sharon’s stroke and abrupt disappear-
ance from the political scene (January 2006); and third, the electoral victory
of Hamas over Fatah in the Palestinian elections (January 2006). The
‘Quartet’ (the USA, EU, UN and Russia) had been given the task of pushing
forward the ‘peace process’ and was of its nature immediately engaged in all
of these events. James Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank, was
designated the Quartet Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement, ‘with a
mandate to revitalize the Palestinian economy which had gone stagnant since
the closure system was tightened at the beginning of the second intifada’.41
After a brisk start Wolfensohn’s mission began to run aground. His attempts
to establish an agreement on access and movement
were intercepted—some would say hijacked—at the last minute by US envoys
and ultimately [US Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice herself. While the
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) of 15 November, 2005, was
painstakingly cobbled together by Wolfensohn and his high-powered team in
the previous months, key alterations were made at the eleventh hour and he was
virtually elbowed aside at the crowning moment. From that moment on his star
in the Middle East peace process firmament began to dim and a few months
later it disappeared altogether when he testified in the US Congress in a way
that left little uncertainty as to his disgruntlement and who he blamed. In the
event he left the scene with a more jaundiced view of Israeli (and US) policies
than he had upon entering.42
Ariel Sharon’s true intentions were clear. Disengagement was no more than a
means of putting the ‘road map’, agreed upon by the Quartet in April 2003,
in ‘formaldehyde’ so that behind the well publicised façade of commitment to
the ‘peace process’ his government could continue to build settlements and its
‘security wall’ on the West Bank without interruption. Israeli troops and
settlers were withdrawn from Gaza, but the territory remained blockaded
from land, sea and air, economically throttled and subject to frequent
devastating military attacks. The adverse Western reaction to the election of
the Hamas government was to greatly worsen the situation. In September
2005, the Quartet had agreed to a formula (announced by Kofi Annan) which
included the position that ‘the forthcoming Palestinian legislative election
should be seen as a stage in the Palestinian evolution towards democracy’,
and that the question of participation should be left to the Palestinians
themselves, notwithstanding the ‘fundamental contradiction’ between parti-
cipation in elections and possession of militias.43 All parties (including Israel)

































were called on to respect the results and co-operate with the Palestinians. The
implicit basis of this approach was the assumption that Fatah would retain
its majority in the Palestinian legislature. In the event it was Hamas which
won a resounding victory. The day after the election the Quartet issued a
statement asserting that ‘a two-state solution to the conflict requires all
participants in the democratic process to renounce violence and terror, accept
Israel’s right to exist and disarm as outlined in the Road Map’. 44
In fact, as the so-called Road Map had already been comprehensively
violated by Israel, the Hamas government would seem to have been justified
in asking which Israel it was expected to recognise, the state envisaged within
the partition lines of 1947, the state which came into existence in 1948 or the
state which seized the rest of Palestine in 1967 and was still proceeding with
its colonisation four decades later. When Hamas refused to yield before the
Quartet’s demands Gaza was placed under full economic blockade, including
the retention by Israel of taxes needed to pay the salaries of employees of the
Palestinian Authority and to fund the operation of hospitals and schools,
while being subjected to the destruction of infrastructure and killing of
civilians by Israel’s armed forces throughout 2006. Israel’s behavior again
raised the question of the Security Council’s inaction in the face of serious,
continuing violations of the UN’s own treaties and conventions. The
blockade was ‘never intended’ by three members of the Quartet but was
imposed on it by the USA.45
Summarising his experiences, Alvaro de Soto writes that ‘whatever the
Quartet was at the inception, let us be frank with ourselves: today, as a
practical matter, the Quartet is pretty much a group of friends of the US—
and the US doesn’t feel the need to consult closely with the Quartet except
when it suits it’. Indeed, the ‘peace process’ as its affects the entire Middle
East ‘has become strategically subservient to US policy’46 —which actually
means, as US policy almost never deviates from Israeli policy, subservient to
Israeli policy. In its statement of 2 February 2007 the Quartet called on all
parties to the ‘peace process’ to ‘refrain from taking any measures that could
predetermine the number of issues that will be resolved in negotiations’,
without mentioning what Alvaro de Soto calls Israel’s ‘total non-compliance’
with the Road Map, requiring it to freeze settlement activity, dismantle
‘unauthorised’ settler outposts (presumably as opposed to authorised illegal
settlements and outposts) and allow the opening of Palestinian institutions in
East Jerusalem. By the time this statement was issued, the supposed
‘evenhandedness’ of the Quartet, which could hardly be taken seriously at the
outset and had been increasingly exposed as sham in the previous two years,
had been ‘pummeled into submission in an unprecedented way’.47
Imprimatur
The Secretary-General was caught between what he was supposed to do in
the name of upholding the UN Charter and what powerful members of the
UN wanted him to do. By issuing statements prepared by the Quartet he gave


































when in fact the Quartet was continually taking positions that would not find
majority support within the General Assembly or the UN’s specialised
agencies and appeared, in Alvaro de Soto’s words, ‘to fall short of the
minimum of even-handedness that must be the lifeblood of the diplomatic
action of the Secretary-General’. The blockade of Gaza, with the EU lining
up in support of the US–Israeli position that there could be no negotiations
with the Hamas government unless it recognised Israel, again compromised
the UN. In the view of Alvaro de Soto, the positions taken by the Quartet
since the end of 2005 ‘led the UN on to thin ice and put personnel in the field
in the uncomfortable position of trying to alleviate the ‘‘siege’’ [of Gaza]
while being seen as one of those who have imposed that siege or at least
having condoned it and also as part of the international effort to maintain it’.
On the broader question of negotiations with all parties involved in the
‘peace process’, pressure by the USA from behind the mask of the Quartet
prevented Alvaro de Soto from making contact with Syria and the Hamas
government. Under the guidelines issued by the Secretary-General, UN
agencies were allowed to maintain such contacts as were necessary for their
work in the field, but high-level political contacts could only be made with
Mr Annan’s authority. In the case of Alvaro de Soto, these were never
allowed, the suggestion being allowed to hang in the air that they would
breach Quartet ‘policy’ and cause difficulties in relationships between
members. Besides two telephone calls on the specific instructions of the
Secretary-General and a chance encounter during a meeting with President
Mahmud Abbas, de Soto had no contact with the Palestinian prime minister
(Ismail Haniyya) or with any member of his elected government before the
formation of a Government of National Unity in 2007. Neither was he able
to initiate a dialogue with Syria. These were all opposed ‘by HQ’—in other
words, by Kofi Annan.
As only one member of the Quartet actively opposed contact with the
Hamas government, ‘the leadership of the PA government might justifiably
wonder whether that member isn’t behind the decision of the Secretary-
General to ostracise that government’. In the case of Syria, its government
‘might be forgiven for wondering whether the Secretary-General’s policy is
inspired not by international law including Security Council resolutions but
by the bidding of one or two permanent members of the Council’. The
implications for the credibility of the UN and the humanitarian work of its
specialised agencies were clear. A Secretary-General who compromises the
independence of his role as outlined in the UN Charter
will do so at the peril of the continued exercise of that role and the cause of
peace in conflicts where he can actually make a difference . . . the practical
translation of the above is that if the Secretary-General is swayed, or is seen to
be swayed, by one or the other Member State, other members, and indeed any
party to a conflict susceptible of being entrusted to the Secretary-General’s
good offices, will justifiably hesitate to deposit that trust in him.
The question arising is whether the Secretary-General discharges his duties
independently, ‘having regard only to the law, the Charter, Council

































resolutions and his own judgment of what is right for a solution of the Arab–
Israeli conflict’, or whether he provides ‘an alibi for a wider strategy which
hasn’t been espoused by the Security Council’. But, as was pointed out
earlier, powerful actors or one powerful actor will only support the
appointment of a Secretary-General who ‘understands the importance of
cooperation with the world’s first power’. Sir Mark Malloch Brown, the
conservative former Deputy Secretary-General to Kofi Annan, has remarked
that ‘I have seen the [humanitarian] work I used to do get steadily more
dangerous as it is seen as serving Western interests rather than universal
values’. For international aid workers to be seen as neutral, their work ‘must
be separated from the US-political and security process and must be there in
its own right’.48
‘Out of balance’
In its Final Report the High-Level Group of the Alliance of Civilisations
noted that the world was ‘alarmingly out of balance’, that it was
characterised by ‘great inequalities and paradoxes’ and that the anxiety
and confusion created by the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory ‘has distorted the
terms of the discourse on the real nature of the predicament the world is
facing’.49 Futhermore:
there is a growing perception that universal principles of human rights and
democratic governance are only vigorously defended in those cases where they
are viewed by some states to be in their interests—a selective approach that
undercuts the legitimacy of the multilateral institutions mandated to articulate,
advance and advocate for those principles. Eloquent statements in support of
democracy lose their relevance when democratically elected governments are
shunned and sometimes subverted by powerful governments.50
The report dilates on extremism and terror, concluding that the only durable
solution lies ‘in addressing the roots of the resentment and anger that makes
exclusivist and violent ideologies attractive in the first place’ and emphasising
the central role that must be played by the UN. The guiding principles set out
by the High-Level Group include ‘adherence to international law and
covenants including all rights and responsibilities governing the conduct of
war as articulated in International Humanitarian Law (particularly the
Geneva Conventions), respect for the institutions that establish them and
support mechanisms that adjudicate violations of these norms’. A ‘full and
consistent adherence to human rights standards forms the foundations for
stable societies and peaceful international relations’, and therefore is part of
what is needed for the world to regain its lost balance. Terrorism can never be
justified, according to the report, which notes that non-state actors are not
alone in employing terrorist methods, giving as examples Nazi Germany, the
USSR, Cambodia (under the rule of Pol Pot) and governments in the
Balkans. (Readers would obviously add to this list according to taste.) Under
the heading of ‘Relations between Societies of Western and Muslim


































or alliance of civilisations agrees is a central cause of tension between the two
groups (as defined), the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The causes of Muslim
resentment are briefly described. Israel’s occupation of Palestinian and other
Arab territories; the ‘unresolved’ status of Jerusalem; the ‘perceived’
acquiescence of Western governments in the Israeli occupation; the Muslim
perception that the occupation is a form of colonialism; the Muslim
perception that the West and Israel collude; and the Muslim perception of
double standards in the application of international law.
The report calls for a non-violent solution ending in a ‘viable’ Palestinian
state living alongside Israel (not a state formed within the boundaries of
presently occupied territory), suggesting that ‘the terms of reference agreed to
by all parties at the Madrid conference in 1991, the peace initiative by
President Clinton in 2000 and the peace proposal by the Arab League at its
meeting in Beirut, Lebanon, in 2002, make it clear that the framework for a
broad-based accord does exist and the political will can be generated’. To
further this process, there should be ‘mutual recognition of the competing
narratives’ that are ‘mirrored in divergent interpretations of recent history’
and ‘different ways of describing conflicts, occupation and peace negotiation
efforts’. The High-Level Group would like to see a White Paper being
prepared on Palestine which ‘would make it clear to the Palestinian people
that the price of decades of occupation, misunderstanding and stigmatization
is being fully acknowledged while at the same time contributing to exorcize
the fears of the Israelis’.
There is much to be said by way of criticism about the way the High-
Level Group has framed this issue. Palestine is not just an issue between
Muslim societies and so-called Western societies. It is an international legal
and human rights issue that cuts across national and cultural boundaries.
Palestinian and other Arab Christians and many people in the so-called
West who are not Muslims have just as strong feelings about it as Muslims
do. There might be a clash of interests on this issue but there is certainly no
‘clash of civilisations’. The colonisation of the territories seized in 1967
(including East Jerusalem) is not really a matter of ‘perception’ by
Muslims or anyone else but a matter of fact (except in the eyes of the
settlers and their supporters). The settlers have been moved into these
territories in clear violation of the laws of war. The references to
‘competing narratives’ and ‘divergent interpretations’ suggest a symmetry
between occupier and occupied, undermining the Palestinian situation
according to the same UN resolutions and conventions the High Level
Group says must be upheld. Collusion, acquiescence and double standards
are not Palestinian or Muslim ‘perceptions’: they accurately describe
Western behavior in the Middle East from the end of the First World War
up to the present.
The ‘peace process’ set up at Madrid did not reveal that ‘the framework for
a broad-based accord and the political will does exist’. It revealed the very
opposite. The Madrid framework for peace was built on the deliberate and
specific avoidance of international law as it related to the rights of the
Palestinians. It is not without reason that the Palestinians regard the ‘peace

































process’ as one of the greatest disasters to befall them since 1948. Israel’s
continued colonisation of Palestinian and Syrian territory and its refusal to
consider Arab offers of peace in return for withdrawal are clear signs that the
political will is a long way from being generated. The High-Level Group’s
claim that the ‘price’ the Palestinians have had to pay is being ‘fully
acknowledged’ is unsupportable if not completely meaningless, even insulting
to the intelligence, against the background of settlement expansion towards
the Jordan river, the ethnic cleansing of Hebron, the killing of thousands of
Palestinian civilians by Israel’s ‘defence forces’ and the blockade of the
democratically elected Hamas government by Israel, the USA and the EU
from the beginning of 2006. The claim that the Annapolis international
conference (November 2007) provided ‘another push to the resolution of the
Arab–Israeli conflict’51 is not shared in the Middle East, where it was widely
seen as just another photo opportunity in the continuing attempt to impose a
settlement on the Palestinians.
It is equally hard to reconcile the situation in Gaza and the West Bank with
the claim that the ‘international community’, with ‘a view to healing the deep
scars of the recent past, has been desperately searching for ways to address
emerging threats emanating from hostile perceptions of other cultures and
civilisations’.52 Nowhere do the scars run deeper than in Palestine, yet even
now the same ‘international community’, broadly speaking, that voted for
the partition resolution of 1947 and thereby condemned the Palestinians to
six decades of torment (so far) is refusing to take responsibility for the
consequences of its actions. It has steadfastly refused to consider a solution
based on the rights granted to the Palestinians under international law.
Nowhere in the West, in its individual governments, regional blocs and the
multinational organisations it dominates, is there any sign of a principled
response to the abuse of international law represented by the conquest and
continuing settlement of Palestinian and other Arab territories. How is
‘dialogue’ going to change this situation?
Governments, NGOs and inter-faith organisations scarcely need any
reminders of the importance of dialogue in bridging cultural gaps and
building more harmonious societies. It is an essential tool of social harmony
everywhere, but the central problems of the Middle East affecting its
relationship as a region with the West are rooted in breaches of international
law and the power politics of sovereign states. Governments that live in
wilful violation of the law, and the governments that support them for
political or strategic reasons of their own, are not likely to be persuaded to
change their ways through ‘dialogue’ unless it is backed by the determina-
tion to punish those who break the law, if the breaches are serious enough,
through sanctions and isolation from international organisations. Where
dialogue is not the problem it cannot be the solution. To be effective, both
‘alliance’ and ‘dialogue’ must be prepared to put forward concrete solutions
to global problems that challenge the structures of power and self-interest. Is
there any chance that they will be accepted? This would seem to be the
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